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RELIGION IN DEMOCRACY:

TOCQUEVILLE'S DEFENSE

by Gary Novak and Kelly Patterson
It is sometimes held to be paradoxical that 1 iberal democracy has
offered no sound justification of itself. For those who are citizens of
liberal democracies, and therefore are concerned not only with the
regime of the fatherland but a 1so with the good regime ,enus, this
paradox causes not only confusion. The citizen is left a so without
justification for the patros: his love of the fatherland has then no
rational logos. There have been various recent attempts to provide
liberal democracy with the justification necessary to survive the attack
of various schools. However one assesses such attempts the serious and
circumspect student of democracy finds his attention drawn, with
increasing frequency, to Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville's
famous commentary on the American democracy.
It is rather well known that Tocqueville saw the hand of history
moving governments inevitably towards democracy. But it is not for this
reason that his book has become important. For the citizen who cannot
ignore Marx's attack upon the necessity of religion, Democracy in
America offers both the defense and the apology for the propagation of
religion in democracies.
This is not to say that Tocqueville
necessarily disagreed with Marx or that he provided the final apoloqia
for religion as such, or even one entirely effective against Marx.
Tocqueville saw political possibilities for religion in the regime
which, for Marx, could only be considered as among the most outward
forms of alienation.
The grounding of regimes on religious beliefs has become
increasingly scarce as more 11 secular 11 political ideologies have gained a
larger degree of popularity in the hearts and minds of citizens. For
numerous reasons, religious beliefs have been separated from the various
liberal conceptions of government which have been crafted in the modern
world.
The growing separation of religion, at least, from the
ideologies of liberal democracy appeared as an anarchy to Tocqueville
and therefore occupied a rather large portion of his writings.
Tocqueville made reference to this queer separation in a letter to a
friend.
What has always most struck me in my country, especially of late
yea rs, has been to see ranged on one side the men who va 1ued
mora 1ity, re 1i gi on, and ordf r, and on the other those who 1ove
liberty and legal equality.
Tocqueville considered the split between those who value religion and
those who love liberty to be dangerous. Implicit in his writings is the
desire to convince the French that religion and democracy are not only
compatible, but that religion is actually necessary to a democratic
regime.
In Democracy in America Tocqueville holds that religion is
useful, even necessary, to a democracy. Religion becomes necessary
because, among other things, of its tendency to control and moderate
Gary Novak and Kelly Patterson are completing Master's degrees in
Political Philosophy. Both Gary and Kelly plan on attending Columbia
University this fall to work on a Ph.D. in political science.
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certain undesirable passions unleashed by the dynamic of democracy. But
Tocqueville's argument that religion is merely socially 11 useful 11 is one
confronted with diverse problems. To simply assert religion's social
utility, in the end, seems to derobe religion of its deepest and most
sacred meanings.
Furthermore, to argue, as Tocqueville did, that
religion must strive to adapt itself as much as is possible to the
various propensities of democracy places religion in an ambivalent
position which might ultimately strip religion of what actually makes it
useful. Tocqueville makes allusion to these problems in his writings,
but he does not explicitly address the implications of these dilemmas.
Tocqueville's thesis concerning religion's utility is therefore crippled
by certain inconsistencies which he resolves by tacitly admitting that,
in the final analysis, democracy ought to abandon religion in favor of
an "enlightened self-interest" which may save it from its inevitable
decline.
On the surface, at least, because of its seemingly straightforward
manner, the argument for religion's social utility seems appealing.
Tocqueville's references to the functional role of religion are legion;
most of the arguments are neither complicated nor detailed. Tocqueville
merely asserts that liberty can only be established ~ith morality, and
that morality cannot be established without faith.
To more fully
understand this apparently utilitarian assertion about religion, the
nature of liberal democracy and its self-destructive tendencies must
first be made clear.
Tocqueville's liberal democracy has been said to consist of
"equality of condition~, representative government, and personal and
intellectual freedoms."
These characteristics find their expression in
a variety of institutions, and Tocqueville is not as concerned with the
specific types of institutions that might reflect these ideals as much
as he is with the fact that the ideals ought to be the goal of the
institution. Tocqueville saw a crucial and distinctive embodiment of
these concepts in the American democracy, and although other countries
could never imitate the American experiment, it was clear that America
was an excellent though general and rough sketch of things to come. To
these cha racteri sti cs of liberal democracy Tocquevi 11 e added a concept
of historical evolution. For Tocqueville, 11 history 11 is ineluctably
moving both people and governments toward democracy. Thus, democracy is
not only characterized by specific social conditions, it is also
typified by the inevitability of its arrival.
The various occurrences of national existence have everywhere
turned to the advantage of democracy; all men have aided it by
their exertions, both those who have intentionally labored in
its cause and those who have served it unwittingly; those who
have fought for it and even those who have declared themselves
its opponents have all been driven along in the same direction,
have all labored to one end; some unknowingly and some despite
them~elves, all have been blind instruments in the hands of
God.
The historical movement is, therefore, a movement in which the various
social dialectics compel nations towards democracy, or rather towards
what Tocqueville called 11 a state of equality."
According to
Tocqueville, this movement is characterized by three main features: 11 it
is universal and permanent, it is daily passi~g beyond human control,
and every event and every man helps it along. 11
Since the advent of a
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democratic society is inevitable and is "daily passing beyond human
control , 11 it is man's duty to make the transition from an 'aristocratic'
age to a democratic age as smooth as is possible. Such attempts may in
the long run help societies to avoid some of the major problems which
confront nations during the transition to democracy. Yet it certainly
seems questionable whether man is able to prepare for and moderate
phenomena which appear to be largely out of his control. In an effort
to reconcile what appears to be a blatant determinism with a theory of
freedom, Tocqueville argues that
Providence has not created man entirely dependent or entirely
free.
It is true that around every man a fatal circle is
traced, beyond which he cannot pass; but within the wide verge
of that circle he is powerful and free; as it is with man, so
with communities. The nations of our time cannot prevent the
conditions of men from becoming equal; but it depends upon
themselves whether the principle of equality is to lead them to
servitude or frE'fdom, to knowledge or barbarism, to prosperity
or wretchedness.
One of the conditions which seems to be within man's "circle of
control , 11 and may be used in conjunction with the emerging principle of
"equality," is religion. Man may, within the sphere of choice open to
him, ascribe no importance or a cruci a 1 importance to the assorted
religious beliefs of his time. According to Tocqueville, this choice is
of the utmost importance since it is in the best interest of nations to
take religion seriously and to nurture it for the highest purposes.
This conclusion follows from Tocqueville's observation that "religion is
considered as the guardian of mores, and mores are regarded as the
guarante 8 of the laws and pledge for the maintenance of freedom
itself."
Tocqueville's claim about religion suggests the crucial
question about the nature of democratic societies:
What are the
features of democratic societies that require religious support to be
able to maintain democratic institutions?
The answer is found in Tocqueville's intriguing description of
democratic societies and especially in a careful examination of the
'individualism' that democratic society tends to produce.
This
individualism, the special democratic manifestation of egoism, when
connected to the equality of conditions generally found in democracies~
promotes a voracious desire in man for material well-being.
Self-interest and personal ambition, in Tocqueville's analysis, become
stronger as the social obligations of constraint and moderation, which
characterize an aristocratic age, are relaxed, and the notion of acting
in one's self-interest, in America the commercial iti1terests, becomes
acceptable through the various market justifications.
The possibility
that society will develop a powerful desire for material well-being
brings with it the potential danger that society will 1pecome atomized as
individuals strive to maximize their material gains.
Consequently, a
democratic society runs the risk of being divided into various competing
pockets of egoistic self-interest, eventually forming commercial
factions whose loyalty to the laws is not determined by any standard of
mores, but is sustained, rather, by the passion for the accumulation of
material goods. It is true that men may view each other as equals in a
democratic society since the rules of the 'economic game' at least
appear to be objective and neutral. However, men are certainly not
equal and do not see themselves as bound to act with regard to one
5

another with compassion, nor are they somehow compelled to mitigate
their selfishness. Thus, religion becomes necessary to legitimate moral
restraints, that is, customs and mores, the norms which make a decent
way of life possible, by enablifg it to promote the virtues of
moderation and sel f-restraint.
Religion, therefore, must be used
as a counterbalance
to the individualistic and hence egoistic
tendencies ~hich are unleashed in the equalitarian conditions of liberal
democracy. 1
It seems to be possible then, that religion provides a crucial
service in the maintenance of the virtues upon which a good society
necessarily rests. This idea is lucidly summed up by one author who
writes: "Virtue, in o1~er to have an influence on society, must have
other worldly support.
Yet it is not entirely clear how Tocqueville
expects religion to be able to support the virtues of society. In some
passages, Tocqueville seems to allude to immortality, to belief in a
reward in another life for submission to a principle of temperance now,
thus appealing to a kind of self-interest. Still other passages seem to
suggest a natural instinct for submission to religious authority.
"Having reached the limits of the political world, the human spirit
stops of itself; in fear it relinquishes the need of exploration; it
even abstains from lifting the veil of the sanctuary; it 1gows with
respect before truths which it accepts without discussion.
In his
work L'Ancien Regime et la Revolution, Tocqueville confirms the
preceding statement: 11 L'incredulite absolue en matiere de religion, qui
est si contraire aux instincts naturels de l'homme et met son ame dans
une assiette si douloureuse, parut attrayante a la foule. 11
Another dimension of Tocqueville's argument concerning the social
utility of 7religion deals with its influence on the "dominance of public
opinion."
Religion not only mitigates the individualistic tendencies
of a democratic society but also tempers the dominion of public opinion.
Religion can bind public opinion to a standard of conduct through
overtly promoting an enabled notion of equality and the rights of all
men. In this situation, men are not as likely to persecute one another
for holding ideas which somehow differ from their own.
Such a
moderating influence can be described as important since the
consideration for the rights of others is not something which "laws or
mores" can fully develop in citizens in and of themselves.
Thus, the lesson that Tocqueville wants men to learn about religion
seems to be clear. Religion ought to be nurtured and guarded as a way
by which the i 11 s of 'democracy' might be tempered and moderated. Yet
it appears to be at least paradoxical to assert, on the one hand, that
religion is a safeguard for democracy and ought to be preserved for that
reason, and yet to argue on the other hand, as Tocqueville does, that
religion must also adapt itself to democratic propensities. Throughout
Democracy in America, Tocqueville argues that a democratic society is
somehow contingent on religion; however, it also becomes apparent from
his writings that religion cannot be considered 18an independent
safeguard, since it is dialectically bound to society.
Tocqueville's
observation that society itself is subject to the opinion of the
majority seems to be a confirmation of the preceding point.
Religion,
he states, "itself holds sway mu~ less as a doctrine of revelation than
as a commonly received opinion.
The interdependence of religion and
democratic society exposes a paradox in Tocqueville's analysis and
therefore suggests some rather interesting questions.
For exa~ple, how
11
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will a religion that is gradually stripped by the encroachments of
self-interest to a set of general ideas about nature and god--that
submits to the tendencies of a democratic society in order to avoid
enraging public opinion, and that derives its influence from those
opinions of the majority--be able to generate a faith which is
sufficiently powerf~b to restrain or alter the behavior of men in a
democratic society?
The answer to this question is apparent and
readily admitted by Tocqueville--it is not entirely possible. The
concessions that religion must necessarily make to democracy in the
first place, in order to have any measure of influence, is only that of
a contract between a parasite and a host. Ultimately, religion has
sealed its own fate by renouncing its claim to be the transcendent truth
for society, the price of which is to be paid by in its own demise.
Another attack on religion comes not from the "opinion of the
majority," but from within the very nature of a democratic society. A
democratic society may exhort people to believe, but because of the very
laws \'lithin a democratic framework, it cannot tell people what to
believe. This dilemma--the exhorting to believe, but pro~iding nothing
to believe--indirectly allows people to believe anything.
A dilemma,
such as the one just described, could account for the extreme reluctance
of Tocqueville to become involved in the debate over the truth or
falsity of religion. In this instance, Tocqueville's chief task was to
find firm beliefs that seemed compatible with democracy and at the same
time produced a type of behavior conducive to the maintenance of
democracy. This task also involved 22e protection of useful religious
beliefs from skeptical objections.
Yet one thing is certain,
Tocqueville was not concerned with the truth-content as such of
religion. This sentiment is reflected in the following:
Certainly the doctrine of metempsychosis is not more reasonable
than that of materialism, but if it were absolutely necessary
for a democracy to make the choice between one or the other, I
should not hesitate, and should think the citizens run less
danger of reducing themselves to the level of brutes by thinking
that their soul wo~~ pass into a pig's body than by believing
that it is nothing.
This quote illustrates Tocqueville's attitude towards religion
throughout Democracy in America. Paradoxically, this attitude about
religion's social utility poses one of the greatest threats to religion
itself. The constant harangue of religion's utility, linked with the
disregard for its truth-content, threatens to undermine the very
influence of religion upon citizens.
Why should citizens of a
democratic society postpone the gratification of desires now if religion
cannot guarantee its promise about rewards in a future life? If the
truth of religion is its social utility, then what type of SUPP?[J: for
society can be expected when the "real truth" is discovered?
Is
religion's truth-content merely its social utility, or is there a
deeper, more sacred content to religion? And what about the individual
who decides that he will act as he pleases? What possible arguments
could persuade the egoist that it is in his best interest to cultivate
democratic virtues? Tocqueville's response to these questions reflects
his concern that if men were to discover that the context of their
beliefs is merely functional, the beliefs then no longer serve to build
democratic virtues. This concern seems to be at the root of various
passages which appear throughout his writings. For example:
7

In such ages beliefs are forsaken through indifference rather
than hate; without being rejected, they fall away.
The
unbeliever, no longer thinking religion true, still considers it
useful.
Paying attention to the human side of religious
beliefs, he recognizes their sway over mores and their influence
of laws. He understands their power to lead men to live in
peace and gently prepare them for death. Therefore, he regrets
his faith after losing it, and deprived of a blessing whose
value he fully apP[~ciates he fears to take it away from those
who still have it.
He continues on the following page stating:
With unbelievers hiding their incredulity and believers avowing
their faith, a public opinion favorable to religion takes shape;
religion is loved, supported, and honored, and only to be
looking in to th~ 6depths of men's souls will one see what wounds
it has suffered.
This argument, at first glance seems to save religion from
undermining itself, that is, if one is only concerned with the utility
of religion and not its truth or falsity. But one must remember that an
increased respect for religion's social position does not fecessarily
mean a corresponding increased respect for religious life. 2 Examples
spread quickly through society and it is not difficult, as Tocqueville
would rather have his readers accept, to separate believers from
nonbelievers. It is dangerous to assert that simply because some do not
believe in religion that they will then not have an impact on society if
they simply do not openly confess their disbelief. In order for the
community as a whole to survive with the opinion that religion is only
functionally true, then a majority of the community would have to act as
though it really is, in the most fundamental sense, true. This is a
difficult 11 deception 11 if one does not really believe religion to be true
and one cannot then guarantee that the correct virtues will be practiced
by the youth.
Secondly, Tocqueville was not an incroyant who regarded his own
loss of faith as a liberation from illusion Af did a great many of the
skeptics of the 18th and 19th centuries.
Thus, Tocqueville was
willing to promote religion while some of his contemporaries were not.
Karl Marx, a contemporary, vigorously argued that religion was not only
false but an illusion which must eventually fade from society. Not only
was Marx an unbeliever, he rigorously campaigned against all types of
11
illusions 11 which seemed to divert man from his 11 species-being. 11 The
major difference between Marx and Tocqueville on the subject of religion
was that Marx saw no real social utility in religion while Tocqueville
perceived in it a great deal of utility and sought to protect it. Yet
Tocqueville's teaching that the truth of religion lies in its social
utility works only in an age when people are willing to remain silent
concerning their disbelief or remain in a quiet state of unbelief. In
this instance, where Tocqueville is confronted by the skeptical argument
against religion, he can offer no real defense since he has already
admitted that the truth-content of religion is of no serious concern.
Tocqueville openly exhibits an eagerness to adopt any 11 myth 11 which might
provide him with the necessary tools to tailor behavior to the needs of
democracy. But his very eagerness to adopt any 11 myth 11 only promulgates
the problem, either directly or indirectly, of the truth-content of
religion.
What options exist, therefore, for society?
Is society
8

compelled to accept any myth with the hope of forestalling democratic
decline? Or is society doomed to abandon its "other worldly" illusions
in hopes of forming a government of enlightened self-interest? Neither
option tempts the pallates of democratic citizens. The first option is
difficult to reconcile with Tocqueville's entreaty for a recognition of
the morally responsible individual. For how can an individual be
morally responsible if his actions rely on knowledge der~~ed from myths
deliberately contrived so as to control his behavior.
The latter
option seems even less appealing because of the uncertainty which
necessarily surrounds large-scale social engineering.
How then is Tocqueville's emphasis on religion to be understood?
Is Tocqueville simply wrong about religion and its real impact on
society, or are men really willing to dacrifice the "content of belief
for the satisfaction of believing." 3
If men are not willing to
sacrifice the content of belief for the satisfaction of believing, then
how is an authentic religion to be reconciled with the demands that a
democratic society inevitably imposes upon it?
The answer to these questions is difficult to fully understand at
times, but in light of Tocqueville's dialectic the answer becomes
unmistakably clear. Tocqueville taught that democracy's decline was
inevitable.
Religion, because of the way it must be adapted to
democracy, no longer provides the virtues needed to sustain democracy.
With a major safeguard no longer effective, the decline of democracy is
inevitable. Tocqueville alludes to this teaching a number of times in
his works. For example, he writes: "Once the American republics begin
to degenerate, I think one will easily see that this is so; it will ~!
enough to notice whether the number of political judgments increases."
The decline in religious activity with the corresponding decline of
democratic society is a pessimistic conclusion drawn from what could
otherwise be considered as optimistic assumptions.
Why then did
Tocqueville not attempt to reconcile the conflicting forces into some
"higher synthesis" in which man might enjoy the fruits of religion and
the benefits of egalitarian conditions? Is decline really inevitable?
Tocqueville seems to address these questions but only in a rather
esoteric manner. Yet what may be gleaned from his writings seems to
point toward the idea that enlightened self-interest is also a doctrine
fraught with difficulties that may be irreconcilable.
In the last analysis Tocqueville seems to place his faith in the
possibility of replacing religions with what he calls an "enlightened
spirit of commerce." In the "Author's Introduction to Democracy in
America," Tocqueville describes a society W~;fh has become democratic
and established "in institutions and mores. 11
In his description of
what appears to be a higher form of society, Tocqueville notes that
. . . one can imagine a society in which all men, regarding the
law as their common work, would love it and submit to it without
difficulty; the authority of the government would be respected
as necessary, not as sacred; the love felt toward the head of
the sta~ would not be a passion but a calm and rational
feeling.
Tocqueville continues in the same passage by stating:
Without enthusiasm or the zeal of belief, education and
experience would sometimes induce the citizens to make great
sacrifices; each man being equally weak would feel a like need
for the help of his companions, and knowing that he would not
9

get their support without supplying his, he would easily
appreciate that or him private interest was mixed up with
public interest.
A society of the genre alluded to by Tocqueville would truly be amazing.
Yet what is particularly unique about Tocqueville's description in the
"Introduction" is that the usual references to religion, which are so
common in the main body of the book, are conspicuously absent. Religion
is perhaps tacitly implied at the beginning when he speaks of the
"established customs and mores," since religion might play a part in
their establishment. But the fact that Tocqueville is able to describe
this society without the routine references to religion might be an
indication that religion is not quite as necessary as Tocqueville
elsewhere seems to assert. Tocqueville, it would appear, leaves the
door open for the possibility that society might be able to go beyond
the need for religion and establish itself on enlightened self-interest.
He was keenly aware of America's character as a trading nation and the
vast resources it possesses which would allow for the realization of
dreams and ambitions through the outlet of labor.
If this trading
spirit could be developed within the proper framework, then society
might attain a level which reflected a better life.
The problem, however, remains the route by which such a society
might be achieved, and Tocqueville provides no clear answers in this
respect. It is highly unlikely that democracy could forego religion in
its effort to create the best society. Yet following Tocqueville's
assumptions, the conflicts which necessarily arise when religion and
democracy are combined make it doubtful that man will ever modify his
behavior to meaningfully complete Tocqueville's portraiture of the
"good" society.
So once again, one finds oneself back at the
pessimistic conclusions that, initially, were to be avoided.
·
The problems posed by the combination of religion and democracy and
the grim prospects for the implementation of a doctrine of enlightened
self-interest leave one frustrated with Tocquevi 11 e's explication of
society. But if Tocqueville is read without the preconceptions of the
modern sociologist, who comes complete with his sophisticated methods,
then such a reading can be very rewarding. Tocqueville masterfully
ill umi na tes the many problems that face democracies, which can help
democracy to a better self-understanding if not to a "better society."
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THE MATHESON COALITION
by Becky Snow
In political circl~, the State of Utah is often referred to as a
"hive of conservatism. 11
Several factors seem to indicate that this
reputation is well deserved. For example, recent survey data indicate
that 54 percent of the voters in the state identify themselves as either
strong, not so strong, or leaning Republicans--this is far above the
national average of ~3 percent Republican identifiers as estimated by
Gallup opinion polls.
Also, many political observers feel that Utah 1 s
all Republican Washington delegation currently constitutes the most
conservative team in Congress.
Additionally, in the Presidential
Election of 1980, Jimmy Cart:fr, the Democratic incumbent, received only
21 percent of the Utah vote.
Voting in intrastate politics, however, is a bit different. The
governorship has been controlled for the past sixteen years by the
Democrats. Three-term Democratic Governor Calvin Rampton preceded the
current Democratic chief state executive, Scott Matheson.
A random
sample of Utah voters who exited from the polls this November were asked
to indicate their general attitude toward several political figures. As
indicated below, data gathered in this "KBYU and Utah Colleges Exit
Survey" (see Appendix) indicates that of all political figures tested,
Governor Matheson is the most favorably perceived politician in the
state.
Table 1
100
74

75

67
49

50

44
23

25

28

9
24

32

24

0
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Monda l e
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Garn

u

Car t er

f

u

Bus h

f

Kenned y

u

Wat t

F

u

Matheson

Reagan

F represe n ts t h e pe rcentage of vote r s th a t rated each politici an f avorabl y
U represents t h e percentage o f v o ter s th at rate d e a ch politician unfavo r abl y

Matheson 1 s second term expires in January of 1985 and there is some
speculation about his running for a third term. Should he decide to
run, his chances for reelection appear to be excellent.
The
favorability ratings, however, present somewhat of an an omaly .
How can
Becky Snow graduated this spring with a degree in Political Science.
While at BYU, Becky was a Truman Fellow and Valedictorian of her
College. She is attending Harvard Law School this fall.
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a Democratic Governor be the most popular political figure in an
overwhelmingly conservative Republican state?
This paper is an attempt to answer that question by examining
additional survey data in an effort to explain or locate part of the
source of Matheson's popularity.
Political scientists generally believe that there are three factors
which can explain an individual's vote--the long-term factor of party
identification, and the short-term variables of issues and candidate
appea 1.
In their book The Changing American Voter, Nie, Verba and
Petrocik detail their extensive study of voters and elections from 1964
to 1976.
During the survey stage of their research effort, these
analysts asked respondents open-ended questions which were designed to
predict the respondent's vote.
When asked to evaluate political
candidates, respondents mentioned the candidate's personality, party
affilia ion, or issue positions as reasons for liking or disliking the
person.
Drawing from these findings, I expected to see that party
affiliation, issue positions, and personal appeal would be factors in
explaining the high favorability rating of Scott Matheson.

4

Party Identification
Party identification is usually viewed as "a psychological
attachment or feeling of loyalty to one political party that develops
during childhood and becomes more intense the longer one is identified
5
with the party. 11
One of the arguments of The American Voter is that
because parties are the most enduring elements of the political
environment, they often serve as a gerceptua 1 screen through which the
elements of politics are evaluated.
Campbell tells us that the very
property of being pro-candidate X or anti-candidate Y, or even of
viewing a political leader favorably or unfavorably, is inevitably
linked to attitudes within a political system that is polarized by two
parties. We should assume, he says, "that public feeling would vary
along this type of two-v lued dimension imposed on political attitudes
1
by our two party system. 11
This theory is exemplified by data on Matheson's popularity
ratings. Below are results of crosstabulations of a voter's rating of
Matheson as favorable or unfavorable, and this individual's party
identification.
I have also shown results for the same cross
tabulations for Reagan's favorable/unfavorable rating.
In this way we
can compare the most popular Democrat with the most popular Republican
in the state.
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Table 2
Matheson
Favorable
Strong Democrat

Reagan

Don't Know

Unfavorable

87

8

Not so strong
Democrat

81

Independent
leaning Democrat

Favorable

Unfavorable

Don't Know

5

13

79

8

16

3

44

47

10

90

7

3

32

57

11

77

16

7

68

25

7

Independent
leaning Republican

72

21

7

94

3

2

Not so strong
Republican

71

21

8

99

l

l

60

34

6

99

l

0

..

Independent

Strong Republican

These data show that Matheson did indeed receive the hi~hest
percentage of favorable ratings from the Democratic identifiers by far,
and Reagan received the highest percentage of unfavorable ratings from
this same group. The figures for the Republican identifiers were vice
versa. The numbers speak for themselves and it is easy to see that
party identification is definitely a factor. Clearly, Matheson received
strong support from the Democrats and Independents, but he also had a 60
percent favorability rate among strong Republicans. We know, then, that
this is not the only variable analysis that needs to be done to explain
Matheson's popularity. If party identification was the only variable
that influenced voter perception, Republicans would always dominate the
popularity scales, as the Democratic party is the minority party in
Utah.
This same cross tabulation (examining vertical rather than
horizontal figures) reveals the fact that of the voters who rated
Matheson favorably, 51 percent, a slight majority, were Republican
identifiers. At least half of the people with whom he is popular
identify themselves with the opposite political party.
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Table 3

Reagan
Matheson

.......
40

40

0

tr on g
mocrat

Not so
strong
Democrat

naeoen ent
leaning
Democrat

In epenaent

Inaeoen en t
leaning
Reoublican

Noc so

eouo~i ca n

strong
Re!)ublican

It is also instructive to note from corner percentaging that 38
percent of all voters were Republican identifiers who voted favorably
for Matheson, 29 percent of all voters were Democrats who favored him,
and only 8 percent were pure Independents.
Obviously, party identification predisposes a voter to think the
way that he does, but we need to go beyond this for an explanation of
Matheson's popularity. These results are in line with Nie's findings
that the frequency with which politicians are preferred on 8he basis of
party alone has declined drastically in the past few years.
Also, the
proportion of voters with a party affiliation--those for whom party
identi ication can play a role in preferencing--is lower than in earlier
years.
To account for voter preferences, then, particularly those of
citizens who cross party lines, or those Independents who have no party
inclinations, we must examine other influences.

9

Issues
Stephen Hess states that "American's i gnoranc of issues is
probably the best documented tenet of voting research." 10 Yet classical
democratic theorists feel that issues should play the decisive role in
electoral preference. The citizen should make a rational decision
between alternatives on the basis of accurate issues information. But,
how can issues even play a role, much less play the decisive role in
political preferences, if Americans don't know anything about them?
Bernard Berelson was one of the first political analysts to
question the competence of the average voter. He did extensive work
analyzing voter's knowledge of two hotly contested issues of the 1948
Presidential campaign. Only 16 percent of his sample knew the correct
stances of both candidates on both issues, while just 33 percent of
those surveyed knew only one position of one Cffdidate. Most knew none
of the issue positions of either candidate.
Other scholars, most
notably Angus Campbell in The American Voter, presented further evidence
which indicated the issue ignorance of the American electorate.
These studies, however, focused on the electorate of the 1950s.
Since that time, analysts who base their arguments on more recent
elections have challenged those findings. One of the most prominent of
these challengers was V. 0. Key. He asserted that voters are reasonable
in their actions, and based this contention on research he had done
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which indicated that switchers (those who voted for candidates
representing different parties in successive presidential elections)
tended to move to the party closest to the voter's own position on some
important issue. Key's findings were limited, but others expanded on
his idea. Natchez and Bupp theorized that the power of issue voting was
underestimated by aggregate voting figures--different issues are
important to different people, and the aggregate figures were hiding any
relationship that might exist. They placed voters into "issue publics"
on the basis of issues important to them, and then examined the
relationship between issue position and vote. The_)f found that issues
were important in vote choice among issue publics. 4 In The Changi n~
American Voter, Nie, Verba, and Petroci k show that from 1964 to 197
voting on the basis of Pf§tY affiliation declined, and voting on the
basis of issues increased.
Most scholars currently believe that there
can be such a thing as issue preferencing--but it is not too common.
Issues can be important to vote choice if several prerequisites are met:
(1) a voter must cognize the issue, (2) the issue must arouse some
minimal intensity of feeling in the voter, (3) he must take a stand on
the issue, and (4) he must perceive that one party or person better
represents his position. "W1is gives him a reason to opt for one party
or person over another. 1
Consider the following facts:
October
national and state une~~loyment figures were in double digits and were
the highest since 1941 ; Gallup pollsters indicated that unemr~oyment
was (and is) the issue most on the minds of Americans ; the
unemployment rate was a key part of campaign rhetoric in the 1982
elections; there was an intensity of feeling on this subject and
finally, the two parties have divergent approaches to dealing with the
problem of unemployment. Because of these considerations, I theorized
that Matheson's popularity rating may have been boosted by those who
were highly concerned about this issue and who favored the Democratic
approach.
My data analysis indicates that people with strong feelings on the
issue of jobs and unemployment may have contributed to Matheson's
favorable rating. I cross tabulated answers to a question that asked
respondents which issues they felt were the most important in deciding
their vote with results from a question asking them to rate Matheson
favorably or unfavorably.
I controlled for party identification,
believing that Democratic party identification would predispose some
voters to feel that jobs and unemployment was the most important issue
in this election. The results were about as I had expected. Fifty-four
percent of all Democratic party identifiers felt that jobs and
unemployment were the major issue underlying their preferences. Of that
group, 85 percent, or 47 percent of all Democratic identifiers, thought
that jobs and unemployment were the major issue and they rated Matheson
favorably at the same time. Of those who identified themselves as pure
Independents, 33 percent felt that jobs and unemployment were the most
important issue, and of those, 86 percent, or 29 percent of a 11 pure
Independents, thought that jobs and unemployment were the major issue
and rated Matheson favorably at the same time.
But, when we turn to the cross tabulations for those who are
Republicans, things are quite different.
Only 9 percent of the
Republican party identifiers felt that jobs and unemployment were a
major issue. Of that group 79 percent, or 7 percent of all Republicans,
thought that this was the major issue and voted for Matheson.
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Table 4
Democrat
Voted Favorably for
Matheson and thought
jobs and unemployment
was one of the major
issues

85 *

Voted Favorably for
Reagan and thought
jobs and unemployment
was one of the major
issues

18

·'

-

Independent

86

47 **

79
29

48
10

Republican

7

96
16

8

* The numbers in this position in the graph cells are percentages of the number
of people who voted favorably for the politician, who thought jobs and
unemployment was one of the major issues, and who identified with one of the
three parties. In other words, these are horizontal percentage figures.
**The numbers in this position indicate the total percentaqe of the three groups
of party identifiers who voted favorably for the politician, and who thought
jobs and unemployment was one of the major issues. These are the vertical
percentage figures.

This picture seems to reflect again the importance of party
identification in determining the concerns of Democratic and Republican
voters, but it takes on additional value when we compare it with cross
tabulations of important issues and popularity ratings for Reagan, the
most popular Republican, again controlling for party identification.
Fifty-five percent of the Democrats felt that jobs and unemployment were
the most salient issue and of these, 18 percent, or 10 percent of a 11
Democratic party identifiers, thought jobs were the most important issue
and rated Reagan favorably at the same time. Of those who identify
themselves as pure Independents, 33 percent believed that jobs and
unemployment were the key issue--of these, 48 percent, or only 16
percent of all pure Independents who thought that jobs were the main
issue also rated Reagan favorably.
Figures for the 8 percent of
Republican party identifiers who felt that jobs and unemployment were
the key issue are not surprising. Ninety-six percent, or almost all 8
percent of these Republicans, had a favorable impression of Reagan. The
difference here that is noteworthy is in the category of Independent
identifiers who felt that jobs and unemployment were the most salient
issue--86 percent voted favorably for Matheson, while only 48 percent
voted favorably for Reagan. For Independent voters, at least, the
popularity ratings appear to have some issue content. Possibly this
issue-oriented group can account for a little of Matheson's popularity,
but the support these individuals lend doesn't begin to explain
Matheson's overwhelmingly favorable rating.
In The Political Behavior of the American Electorate, Flanigan and
Zingale state that because people are not familiar with the issues and
they are not offered a polarized choice by parties or politicians, they
adopt the position of their favorii 9 politician.
In essence, the
politician provides issue leadership.
The real determinant of voter
preference, then, is not issue orientation, but candidate/politician
appeal.
Possibly, Matheson's popularity can be explained by his
personal appeal.
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Personal Appeal
As was discussed earlier, Natchez and Bupp found that issue voting
occurred in issue publics. However, they did not deny the importance of
partisan affiliations or of the personal appeal of politicians in
preferencing decision. In fact, they asserted that candidate/politician
ima~e wa~ substantially more important than issues in influencing these
choices. 0
The findings of many other scholars support this proposition.
Campbell's work in The American Voter indicates that about 75 percent of
all the votes for President in 1956 could be predicted on th~ basis of
attitudes toward the personal cha racteri sti cs of Eisenhower. 1 In The
Changing American Voter the authors assert that in 1976, voting on the
basis of party affiliation increased (from what it had been from 1964 to
1972) and simultaneously, voting on the basis of issues decreased. The
1976 Election results did not represent a full return to the pre-1964
elections--elections which the authors feel demonstrated an overriding
voter concern with candidate personality. The issues appeared to lose
much of their power over the vote, but party identification as an
influence only recovered some of its power. This change, they feel, was
due to the changing cast of political characters. The major debate
between Carter and Ford was not a difference in policy goals, but it was
a question of who was more competent to achieve these policy goals.
Both candidates played down the issues because polls seemed to indicate
that the voters were more interested in the ~haracter of the candidates.
They were interested in personal qualities. 2
Gerald Pomper's research lends additional credibility to this
conclusion.
In 1972, his research team asked voters a series of
open-ended questions designed to get respondents to freely discuss
candidates and political parties.
Respondents' remarks were then
classified as favorable or unfavorable. A majority of the comments made
(both positive and negative) dealt with strictly personal candidate
attributes and characteristics. Pamper believes that voters perceived
Senator McGovern to be deficient in leadership abilities and
character--according to Pamper, 21ck of positive candidate appeal was
the reason for McGovern's defeat.
Similarly, Patton and Kaericher conducted two separate supporting
experiments--one in which they surveyed college students' opinions
concerning purposefully created (fictional) candidates, and another
study in which they questioned registered voters with regards to actual
candidates. For both samples, the candidate who was more credible,
likeable, and demographically s1214ilar to the electorate got
significantly more favorable ratings.
Joseph P. Forgas challenged the findings of other analysts on this
topic. He felt that there were "at 25 ibute dimensions that were used to
differentiate between politicians,"
but he felt that the results of
other studies were inaccurate because they were obtained within the
context of a volatile political situation (an election) and thus did not
adequately reflect the multidimensional complexity of political
judgments. He also felt that the dimensions of candidate appeal were
not psychologically unique--personal appeal and issue appeal are often
interrelated and it is impossible to tell if the public shows approval
of a spokesman or of the spokesman's philosophy. To correct for these
things, Forgas studied political leader appeal outside of the context of
an election, and he used INDISCAL analysis to separate policy factors
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from personality factors. He analysis showed, in accordance with the
other studies, the personal qualities of politicians (likeability,
flexibility, :Afld goodness) emerged as salient dimensions of political
preferencing.
What, then, are these personal attributes that affect the
popularity of a politician? Hess tells us that a self-selective process
is as active in the political field as it is in any other occupational
area. Popular and successful politicians have similar aptitudes, skills
and personalities just as popular doctors do. Also, doctors are more
likely to be like other doctors tha~fhey are to be like engineers--this
is also the case with politicians.
But, as with anythizW else, the
stereotype of a perfect, popular politician does not exist.
Numerous scholars, however, have given listings of qualities that
the electorate perceives positively in a politician. Clinton Rossiter
tells us that the public likes self-made men who are cultural middle
brows ( they 1 i ke both sports and concerts), who have achieved, a re
friendly, intelligent (though not intellectual), eloquent, of good moral
repute, will'!t9g to serve faithfuTly, and who are moderate in their views
and tastes.
Campbell adds that popular politicians (such as
Eisenhower) are good leaders, effective administrators, decisive, and
independent. They know how to handle people, they are inspiring, a
little idealistic, patriotic, kind, warm,
ligious and likeable. Most
of all, they are sincere men of integrity. 30 Polsby and Wildavsky feel
that in addition to these other qualities, a politician will be both
popular and effective if he is mature, and outwardly comfortable in any
situation. They note, however, that a politician need not have all of
these characteristics to ~1 popular--in fact, he should not have them
all or he will be suspect.
As the previous listing indicates, an individual faced with the
problem of judging a candidate's qualifications or a political leader's
performance may be divided between assessing a number of attributes.
But what characteristics are most important? A person who was deeply
affected by the Watergate scanda 1 may pl ace a premium on the persona 1
characteristic of honesty or integrity. If one is poor or unemployed,
he may weight the socioeconomic background of the politician more
heavily.
T. L. Saaty and J. P. Bennett try to reduce these
multidimensional considerations into a hierarchy of a one-dimensional
scale which will explain the electorate's responses to objective
personality criterion.
The authors of this theory of analytical
hierarchies use what they call an "eigenvector" approach to evaluate
voters' priority setting measures. They judge politicians by personal
attributes on a scale as follows:
(Those characteristics with the
highest eigenvector values are the most significant attributes.)
Attribute
Personal integrity
quality of moral standards, trustworthiness
Past performance
quality of role fulfillment, regardless of what
that role was
Experience
past office holding or related activities

Eigenvector
.2066
.1697
.1688
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Honesty
lawfulness in public life, law abidingness
Charisma
personal leadership qualities inspiring
enthusiasm and support
Glamour
charm, allure, personal attractiveness,
association with the attractive

.1678
.0427
.0252

Saaty and Bennett believe that individuals intuitively resort to a
similar simplifying and weighting process (though hardly as systematic
o~ rigi9~ to reach an overall appraisal and rating of political
figures.
Unfortunately, I am unable to apply or test the Saaty/Bennett model
to data about the popular characteristics of Matheson. When one is
conducting an exit po 11, such as the II KB YU/Utah Co 11 eges Survey, 11 he is
severely limited in the amount of time that he is reasonably allowed to
spend with each respondent.
For this reason, open-ended questions
designed to examine the source of individual politicians' popularity, or
questions which would explore the importance of Matheson's personality
traits were not included in the survey.
My only recourse, then, is to try to analyze Governor Matheson's
popularity in another way--an analysis that I can support with empirical
evidence. Donald Stokes tells us that the word 11 appeal 11 in the term
personal or candidate appeal implies more than something about the
candidate/politician himself; it also implies something about the
dispositions of the electorate. It is easy to see why Eisenhower was so
popular if one understands the dominant values and preferences of the
people in American society at that time. But one can also see that
Eisenhower would not have been as popular before an electorate
consisting only of American political science professors--a group much
less impressed by a milffary conqueror and less susceptible to the
appeal of personal charm.
Eugene J. Watts tested the assumption that in democratic societies
office seekers and office holders are viewed favorably by the electorate
because they possess certain attributes. He attempted to measure and
define this process of "social filtering." Watts found, as have other 34
that a combination of certain attributes does carry public favor.
But, applying Stokes' concept, wouldn't it logically follow that the
electorate who establish and constitute this filter, or groups within
the electorate, also share certain attributes?
We know from the work of Paul Lazarsfeld, and others, that
political preferencing is essentially a social or group experience.
People who live in the same environment, under similar conditions, and
belong to the same general groups are likely to develop similar needs
and attitudes. They see the political world through the same pair of
colored glasses. They will like the same political candidates--that is,
if they are aware of the goals of their own group and i!s they pay
attention to the politicians' actions, goals, and intentions.
Operating under this supposition I tried to locate and analyze the
demographic composition of Matheson's support among Utahns--the Matheson
coalition. Cross-tabular analysis of demographic considerations and
favorability ratings for each of the politicians tested yields the
following results:
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Table 5

DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF VOTERS BY FAVORABLE POL~TICIAN RATINGS
the politicians favorably. )
( All numbers shown are percentages of those in each group who rated
Matheson

Reagan

Garn

Bush

Watt

Mondale

Carter

Kenned·

Favorability Rating

74

72

7l

49

32

32

28

24

Sex:
Male
Female

73
74

74
69

74
69

54
42

40
22

3l
33

27
29

22
22

73
73
77

74

58
62
73
76

39
45
46
57

38
32
28
37

41
34
31
30

43
34
22
27

38

72

57
65
76

7l
7l

59
73

43
45
45
54
62

23
25
32
38
41

33
32
30
36
25

36
33
27
26
19

30
27
23
22
12

Education:
No high school diploma
Completed high school
Some college
Four years of college
Income:
Under $10,000
$10 ,000-14,999
$15,000-24,999
$25,000-50,000
$50,000

34

18
20

74

72

77
72

74

84

65
65
69
76
80

Age:
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+

67
72
72
78
74
79

79
72
73
68
65
7l

7l
68
73
74
70
73

44
47
51
47
51
58

17
26
36
39
35
49

28
28
31
34
37
44

18
25
26
26
34
4l

16
24
24
23
26
34

Those unemployed in
the last 12 months

74

62

61

40

28

32

27

26

Religion:
Protestant
Catholic
Mormon
Jewish
No preference

81
79
7l
78
88

51
43
82
60
30

51
46
80
46
34

51
49
50
36
36

25
18
37
27
12

44
46
28
36
47

38
43
23
36
46

33
46
17
36
49

The table seems to indicate that, although there was basically no
difference between the percentage of men and women in their rating of
Matheson, women rated him slightly more favorably than they did other
candidates. J. Keith Melville suggested that this relationship might be
due to Matheson 1 s stances against the old MX missile basing plan and the
storage of nerve gas bombs in Utah. Women are very discriminating
voters, but would be attracted by these pos~tions, Melville feels,
because they are pro-life, pro-family stances.
Having learned from
Wolfinger and Rosenstone that almost any electoral differences between
men and women can be accounted for by :PJifferences in other demographic
variables--most notably education level --I ran another test using both
education and party identification (the ever-present voter perceptual
filter) as control variables. This analysis confirmed the fact that men
and women within education and party categories made very similar
preference ratings. There was no regular pattern to their occasional
differences. Women in the same education and party identification
categories do generally rate Matheson more favorably than they do other
candidates--but there is only a slight difference. Most of the variance
can be explained by party identification and the Independent vote. It
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appears that sex may play a small role in determining rating as far as
the Independents (regardless of education categories) are concerned.
Comparing the figures for Scott Matheson and Ronald Reagan, a male
Independent would rate either politician favorably 75 percent of the
time. A female Independent would rate Matheson favorably 86 percent of
the time, and Reagan would receive only 68 percent favorable ratings.
Therefore, as far as Independents are concerned, Keith Melville's
pro-family theory may be valid.
Table 6
WOMEN
Rated Matheson Favorably:
No High
School Diploma
Democrat

Independent
Republican
Rated Reagan

Democrat

Independent
Republican

Completed
High School

Some
College

Four y ears
of College

74%

84

95

94

so

86

88

$!8

66

76

75

24

23

29

22

100

63

72

64

100

99

98

9$!

45
a v ,.•1.L a...J .L Y

:

Next, I examined the factor of education.
It appears from the
demographic chart (Table 5) that Matheson is most popular with those who
have attended four years of college or more. This is as would be
expected not only because the highly educated are characterized as being
more liberal, but also because the more educated are the most likely to
defect from their party leanings and vote for the person rather than the
party. The educated would be the best informed. They are more likely
to know what Matheson is doing in office. They would know if he is
competent, if he has researched his issue positions, if he is evenhanded
in his judgments, and if he has pursued the best interests of the state.
The data supports this idea quite well.
Controlling for party
identification, we can see that the more educated groups were more apt
to rate Matheson favorably than were the less educated. It is important
to note the significant amount of positive favorabil ity support that
Matheson got from the college educated--thi s group ( those who had had
either some or four years of college) constituted 63 percent of his
Democratic support, 69 percent of his Independent support, and 79
percent of his Republican backing. Conversely, the college educated
made up only 59 percent of Reagan's Democratic backing, 71 percent of
his Independent support, and, interestingly, 78 percent of his
Republican support. Therefore, a Republican who had attended college
was just as likely to rate Matheson favorably as he was to rate Reagan
favorably.
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Table 7

Percentages of those voting favorabl y for the politicians :
Matheson

Reagan
Dem.

Indep.

Rep.

Dem .

No High School
Diploma

75

75

59

29

100

93

Completed
High School

84

66

66

23

60

99

Some College

89

77

65

25

69

42

Four years of
College

94

86

68

23

66

98

Indei:,.

Re;,.

Next, I checked the demographic characteristics of income and age.
As the demographic chart (Table 5) indicates, Matheson got most support
from the group of people who had incomes ranging from $25,000 to
$50,000. He also got heavily favorable ratings from those voters who
were 65 years of age and older. The income relationship was a bit
perplexing to me. But, Matheson's wife is very active in senior citizen
causes, so I could understand their rating him very favorably. However,
I checked the relationship in both demographic categories by cross
tabulating them with the favorability ratings again--this time
controlling for both education and party identification.
Both
previously apparent relationships were entirely explainable by the two
control variables.
Those who had been unemployed at some time in the past 12 months
rated Matheson much more positively than they rated other political
figures, according to Table 5. But, mostly Democrats must have been the
unemployed individuals in this state, because when we controlled this
analysis by party affiliation, no true relationship existed between
employment status and favorability relationships. Only the Independents
appeared to be affected by this factor. Eighty-one percent of the
unemployed Independents favored Matheson while just 53 percent rated
Reagan favorably.
It has been said that in the State of Ut~, Republican political
views are equated with LOS Church doctrine.
The fact that the
Democratic Governor (though technically he is LOS) is rated least
favorably by the Mormon voters, according to Table 5, lends some
credibility to this statement. But before making any conclusions, I
again cross tabulated the religion data by the favorability data, and
this time controlled for party identification. Instead of eliminating
apparent relationships as before, this control variable highlighted the
importance of religious affiliation in questions of political
favorability in Utah. The table below shows the tremendous effect that
party identification can have on perception, but note that in all party
affiliation categories the Protestants and those who had no preference
or no religious affiliation rated Matheson more favorably than did the
Mormons. ( No cone 1us ions were drawn about Jewish voters because our
sample contained only seven such individuals.) These figures are even
more informative when they are compared with the same numerical analysis
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for Reagan. Here, Mormons in every political identification category
rate Reagan favorably much more frequently than do members of any other
religious group. Since the vast majority of respondents (74 percent)
were Mormon, we might say that this particular group escalated Reagan's
favorability rating and held Matheson's down slightly. Note also the
wide gap between the Independent Mormons' fa vorabi 1ity percentage ( for
Reagan) and the favorability percentage of all of the other religious
groups i n the category.
Table 8
Per c entages o f those v oting favora bly f o r t he p oli t i cians :
Reagan

Math eson
De m.
Pr o testant
Ca tholic
Mormon
J e wish
No p reference
Pre f er not
to sa y

I n dep .

Reo .

91

82

84

71

86

Dem.

I ndep .

Rep .

71

10

36

9_4

68

23

29

93

74

65

31

80

98

80

100

67

20

100

100

92

82

81

15

41

94

88

10 0

100

14

40

100

Nie, Verba, and Petrocik found that white Protestants outside of
the South have moved slightly farther to the right in the past few
years. This group had been as solidly Republican as white Southerners
had been Democratic. Our data indicates that this may hold true for the
Protestants in Utah. The authors of The Changing American Voter al so
state that Catholics and Jews are minorities with a traditional
Democratic preference (though recently Catholics have become more even
divided between the parties and Jews have moved farther to the left).
If the authors were so inclined, our data indicates that as far as
favorability ratings are concerned, they could add Mormons to their list
of minorities with a traditional preference--Republican.

4~

Conclusion
We can say, then, that certain groups of voters (Democrats, those
Independents concerned with jobs and unemployment , Independent women,
the college educated, and members of Utah's religious minorit i es) more
heavily favor Scott Matheson and thereby contribute to his high
favorable rating. These groups, however, do not account entirely for
the popularity ratings of Matheson. To do this, we would need to gather
additional data--we would need to ask voters not simply to rate
politicians on a favorability scale, but to tell us why they rated the
individuals the way that they did. Maybe the voters like Matheson
because he isn't a political opportunist, or because he is sincere, he's
an underdog as a Democrat in this state, he doesn't wear his re l igi on on
his sleeve, _he answers his mail, and he's "down to earth." These may
not be considerations at all. At this time, then, the question that has
been raised cannot be fully answered.
But research done to this point
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seems to indicate that the key to the riddle lies in Matheson's personal
appeal.
The idea of political preferencing by personal appeal is disturbing
to some. In referring to the Presidency, James David Barber says that
"it is not comfortable to ~ave to rely on the character of a man for the
health of our democracy." 4 Still, voting or preferencing on the basis
of personal character can be seen as a rational decision making process.
I believe that Utah voters have made a rational preference decision
regarding Scott Matheson. We usually think of rational decision making
in politics only in terms of issue voting. But, can't voters be
considered just as rational if they make their preferencing or candidate
selection with the idea that one person will or does carry out
acceptable policies more se'1fjbly, efficiently, honestly, and
competently than others would.
Stanley Kelley felt that these
questions of personal character are especially important in American
politics since our system is not characterized by strict political party
discipline. He believes that an individual's personality has great
impact on his conduct as an office holder--especially on\~ state and
local levels where political officials are less restricted.
I concur with Stephen Hess, who feels that if our system cannot
equally test all of the characteristics that are necessary for success
in public office, then the voter in his political decision making
process should give priority to the personal attributes of politicians.
These characteristics are the most immutable--they are the least likely
to change as problems arise in office. Elected officials can become
better political executives, they can (and often do) change their issue
positioij~ and party affiliations, but they cannot become better
people.
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APPENDIX

EXIT SURVEY
Sponsored by KBYU and Utah Colleges
1. In the Senatorial race who did you just vote for?
Orrin Hatch, Republican
~9~·2 0 Ted Wilson, Democrat
/ =k; 3·O Someone else
- SO Did not vote for Senator
- 80 Do not remember
2 1"90 Prefer not to say

7. Which issues were most important in deciding how you

::-l'n O

voted today?
1z:J,1.O Interest rates

2,4

2-0 Jobs and unemployment

1L½ 3-0 Inflation
1 4.Q Defense spending

(14) '1..9 5.Q Maintaining Ronald Reagan's economic polic ies
9 6-0 Social Security
l.D 7 .O Other
(221

2. Was your choice for senator mostly a vote:
} ·7'i1 O In favor of your candidate
1o 20 Against his opponents
1 3-0 A random selection
t 9.Q Prefer not to say

8. In the election today there were four ballot propositions.
How much attention did you pay to news and information
(15)
about these propositions?
-----------------------1-+1 %
10 A lot
'-132-0 Some
3. When did you make your final decision about your vote
\ 1.. 3.Q A Little
(23)
for senator?
4 4.Q None
~" 1.Q Today
2-0 Over the weekend
9. How did you just vote on Proposition 1 the revenue and
) 3.Q During the past week
, 4.Q 2-3 weeks ago
taxation article revision?
r sn 4-5 weeks ago
~2%1-0 For
, SO Aug-Sept
33 2-0 Against
3-0 Did not vote on this proposition
7 7 0 June/ July
1 4.Q Cannot remember how I voted
3 8.Q before June
24 ]
(16) · 3 9.Q Prefer not to say
..: 90 Prefer not to say

z.

0. What was your most important source of information on
Proposition 1?
2.41~1.0 Television
11 2-0 Radio
·r , 3-0 Newspaper
12., 4.Q Word-of-mouth
(17) 1i.:; 5.Q Voter Pamphlet
60 Some other source
80 Didn 't pay much attention to the propos itions
[251
5C. In the U.S. Representative race who did you just vote
for?
58
5A
:'l,11 O Hank Huish, Independent +-f";'o ?.:l~j iDi "lo ·r1an:e
1. When did you make your final decision about your vot e
t 2!7 Howard Nielson , Republican 53 Mam.:.ot!: 35" DLr k..s
on Proposition 1?
3.r. Someone else
"2fY/,1 O Today
SO Did not vote for U.S. Representative H 2J7 Over the weekend
8.n Do not remember
2..Jp 3n During the past week
; 9.1 , Prefer not to say
3
(20) :.:3 40 2-3 weeks ago
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -1 i+ SJ_J More than a month ago
3 9n Prefer not to say
(25 ]
3. Was your cho ice for U.S. Representative mostly a vote:
r7o1 .- in favor of your cand idate
~ 2.: against his opponents
Please go to
'3 3r a random se lection
Page 2
1 9.1 Prefer not to say
(21 )

4. Voters sometimes change their minds about candidates

during a political campaign. Who was your original
choice for Senator?
:'.'io1 O Ted Wilson
? 2-0 Orrin Hatch
30 Another Candidate
, 90 Prefer not to say

-----------------------1 ,

+

Page 2

12. How did you just vote on Proposition 2 regarding
c:-:impensation and expenses of legislators?
: :i 17.,1(] For
: i 2-C] Against
Did not vote on this proposition
Cannot remember how I voted
i.:..
SO Prefer not to say

18. During the next year, do you think your family 's finances
will:

40"7o1 O Get better

15 20 Get worse

3n
., 4n

3• 30 Stay the same
15 80 Don't know

(33]

(2

19. Which best describes your employment status?
13. How did you just vote on Proposition 3 which would
5(J73 O Employed by someone else
require members of the legislature to continue to reside
1+ 20 Self-employed
in their districts during their terms of office?
5 30 Unemployed
-~ } _,1 O For
13 40 Homemaker
::; 20 Against
4- 50 Student
:\ 30 Did not vote on this proposition
Retired
13
40 Cannot remember how I voted
i 90 Prefer not to say
(34]
3 SO Prefer not to say
(28), _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

·so

1

20. How worried are you about losing your job in the near
14 . How did you just vote on Proposition 4 which would

future?
remove the prohibition against corporate officers. agents
7'ia1 O Very ·worried
or employees from holding office in the town, city or
IC'\ 20 Somewhat worried
county which granted their business license.
'74- 30 Not very worried
[35]
-7-7,,1O For
~1
20 Against
l;;
30 Did not vote on this proposition
21. On most political matters do you consider yourself:
2.. 40 Cannot remember how I voted
i 11~1 O Strongly Conservative
i.;.. SO Prefer not to say
(29 lf3 20 Moderately Conservative
::.i 30 Neither, Middle of the road
i o 40 Moderately Liberal
15. Generally speaking do you consider yourself to be:
3 50 Strongly Liberal
,.,-7,, 1 O Strong Democrat
7 90 Don 't know, No Opinion
[36]
·/- 2[7 Not so strong Democrat
30 Independent leaning Democrat
, 40 Independent
22. In general, which do you rely on most for news about
, 50 Independent leaning Republican
politics and current events?
,. 60 Not so strong Republican
52.'?.,10 Television
:..-: 7 O Strong Republican
31 20 Newspapers
~
80 Other _ _ _ __
30 Magazines
-3 SO Prefer not to say
(30] 7 40 Radio
iD SO Other_____
[37]

+

6. Compared to a year ago, is your family's economic
situation:
7:1 1,1
Better today
."'>'.: 20 Worse today
+z.. 30 About the sa-:ie
i

n

23. How often do you read the newspaper?
;.;7.!i,,1 O Everyday
ZD 20 A few times a week
(31] 9 30 Once a week
,., 40 Less than once a week
4 SO Don't read the newspaper

17. Were you out of work or laid off at any time during the

last 12 months?
·1'701 -C]Yes
?! 2n No

[32]

Please go to
Page 3

[38]

Page 3

24. Marl< an "X" to show your general attitude toward each
29. Was your 1981 family income:
of the following people. As of today, what is your
;5':01 O Under S10,000
I'+ 20 S10,000-S14,999
impression of:
Don't 33 3.Q S15,000-S24,999
UnFavorable favorable Know 3 i 40 S25,000-S50,000
(5 1]
52-,"lri 1. 0 ~1o 3. Q3C.t1a [Il39] l 50 Over SS0,000
A. Walter Mondale
8 . Jake Gam
, I 1. 0 Z3 3. 0 G 8. [ ! 1 ) 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2"? 1. Qta2-3.Q108.~]
C. Jimmy Carter
49 1. O 2.9 3. O z;z....8. [!2] 30. What. if any, is your religious preference?
D. George Bush
E. Edward Kennedy
z.4 1. O (I) 1 3. O 9 8. (!t3] 9%1 O Protestant
F. James Watt
3:z.. 1. O 44 3. O Z.4 8. [3!4] 7 20 Catholic
G. Scott Matheson
74 1. 0 ZO 3. 0 ic 8. [!51 74 3.Q Mormon
H. Ronald Reagan
1. O Z..tf 3. O 5 8. (!6]
i 40 Jewish
7 50 No Preference. no religious affiliation
(52]
3 90 Prefer not to say
25. In your opinion, is it proper for candidates to use their
church positions as political qualifications?
, , 1J-, 1 O Yes, it is proper
31. Do you consider yourself active in the practice of your
reUgious preference?
7.1 2.Q No, it is improper
i..,,qo/,1O Yes
L- 30 I haven 't thought much about this
(47] i O 20 Kind of
;_ 8.Q I have no opinion
i't' 3.Q Not very
5 8.Q Not applicable
26. Are you or anyone living in your household a union
3 90 Prefer not to say
(53]
member?
2.2.%1 O Yes
32. Are you:
""7 "1 2.Q No
; 9.Q Prefer not to say
[48] ,31~ 1 O Mexican American
- 20 Black
i 3.Q Oriental
27. What was the last grade in school you attended?
95 40 Caucasian
1 2."!o
l '{ - 7-'t
(54]
-i f~1 O Did not graduate from high school
1 5.Q American Indian
~ 'l
25 - 3 ~t
;:.3 20 Completed high school
LO
:',.:, -i pt
?,"'t 3-CJ Some college but not four years
[
49]
33.
What
year
were
you
born?
_
i_7_
+5 · s+
(55-561
3 :z.. 40 Four years of college or more

, z..

; z..

28. Do you own the place where you now live, or do you pay
rent?
,7'1;;10 Own
, 7 20 Rent
~ 3-CJ Uve rent-free

55-

~t

34. Are you
$3",o1 0 Male
47 20 Female

(57]

(50]
Thank You!

Time of interview _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(Military Time)

(1-2)

Your S c h o o l - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

[3]

County where interview occurred _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(4-5]

Voting prec inct number _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(6-B]

02581

Case I.D. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Respondents Sex _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

(9-12]
(13]

SELECT FUNCTIONS OF PRICE, SUPPLY, AND DEMAND
IN MARKET AND STATE ECONOMIES
Study II
by Gilbert Almquist
Introduction
More than any other market aspect, price has the most direct
linkage to supply and demand.
Suppliers make product decisions
according to production costs. Consumers decide their purchases after
considering prices. Most prices are not set arbitrarily. Many factors
must be analyzed before proper prices are applied. For this reason, the
market manager must consider pricing strategies, evaluate applicable
factors, set the price, predict its effect on the market, then observe
the outcomes. Sometimes the outcomes are not in accord with the
predictions. Prices and their effect on market supply and demand are
not absolute. There are varying aspects in the market which make
predictions mere assumptions or speculations in most cases. In the case
of price effects, the predictions have the least degree of certainty.
Adam Smith proposed in his book The Wealth of Nations that an
invisible hand is at constant work in the marketplace. Market research
does not always reveal what is actually taking place between the
consumers and suppliers. The market's behavior in response to an action
or event is not as easily observed as with other sectors of the economy.
However, predictions based on numerous case studies can be made with
some degree of accuracy.
Predictions are usually based on the
proposition that the market is behaving rationally. Nearly every
hypothesis and theory concerning the marketplace is based on this
proposition.
This study will focus on those hypotheses and theories associated
with price, supply and demand. The specific purpose of the paper is to
explain how price affects supply and demand in state and market
economies. The paper will also address the reciprocal relationship by
reversing the independent and dependent variables; namely, how supply
and demand in state and market economies affect price.
Economics of Price, Supply, Demand and Equilibrium
I~ market economies, supply and demand interact to determine
price.
In state economies the opposite might also be true--price can
be used to determine supply and demand. Regardless of which format,
certain general rules apply to each of the three elements in both
economies. All three play a part in determining the means by which to
achieve favorable ends.
Jack Hirshleifer states that the most important m~rket goals (ends)
are achieved by considering two analytical techniques:
Gilbert Almquist is completing his Master's degree in Geography.
He plans on graduating in August and then moving to the East Coast for
employment opportunities. He is currently employed by the Department of
Political Science as a graduate instructor for Political Inquiry.

29

1.

Optimization

attainment of a best or preferred
market position

2.

Determination of
Equilibrium

the condition of market balance when
all individual decisions work together.

To understand how these techniques apply directly to the topic, the
supply and demand diagram should be used.
The two axes below represent Price (P) and Quantity (Q). Ratios
are formed by their interaction and establish the supply (ss) and demand
(dd) curves. For each price of a given product (A) there will be a
corresponding number supplied and demanded.
The theory of demand explains that the lower the consumer price,
the more demand for the product. This condition is represented by Od.
However, the supply curve shows that suppliers are only willing to
produce at Qs for the lower price. Therefore, a shortage for that
product will exist. Competition for a scarce commodity will place
pressure on the price. In time, price will increase to the point where
the demand and supply curves cross. This is the equilibrium point (E).
The equilibrium theory of price explains that "two forces operate in the
field of price--supply and demand. These forces bring about a price at
which the quantity dema~ded by buyers equals the quantity that sellers
are willing to supply."
At this point there is no upward or downward
pressure on price--the market is running smoothly, and price is stable.
Markets generally work toward the equilibrium position automatically
when outside forces do not interfere.

p

Q

Supply-Demand Diagram/Product A
This brief overview leaves the impression that the market in
relation to price, supply and demand operates like clockwork. The truth
is that this diagram by pure definition is only a model--the purpose of
which is to he 1p predict the consequences of changing price in the
market.
The convergence point of the supply and demand curves show the
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equilibrium values of price and quantity exchanged. This is the point
of optimization or preferred market positions.
The model helps
facilitate the determination of this equilibrium where all individual
market decisions work together at maximum efficiency.
Elasticity
One of the most important aspects of price and quantity in any
economy is elasticity. Elasticity is computed using the following
formula:
percentage change in quantity d~manded
percentage change in price
For each product on the market there is an elasticity curve. This
curve indicates how flexible demand is when prices change for a
particular product. The more horizontal the elasticity curve, the more
flexibility the product has in respect to price changes (A).
Conversely, the more vertical the elasticity curve, the more
inflexibility the product has (B). For example, the elasticity curve
for a certain brand of common breakfast cereal is fairly horizontal (A).
The reason for this is the number of substitute products on the market.
It is easy to substitute another similar product for the one with an
increasing retail cost. On the other hand, insulin is considered
inelastic. Consumer demand is stable regardless of price. There are no
substitutes for insulin; therefore, the elasticity curve is nearly
vertical (B).
Market managers should steer companies toward the production of
i ne l asti c products--those with elasticity curves approaching the
vertical. This would insu 5e more stability of demand for those products
should the economy weaken.
Producers must also be aware that competing
firms may develop similar or substitute products. The effect this has
on the elt5ticity curve is to pull it toward the horizontal position
over time.
Therefore, production secrets must be well-protected, and
new technology developed that secures the product's uniqueness year
after year.

A

---

B

\

Market Economies
Fi rs t, it should be noted that the ideal market economy does not
widely exist. "The only major exceptions," according to Milton Friedman
are, "nearly a century of free trade in Great Britain after the repeal
of the Corn Laws in 1846, thirty years of free trade y, Japan after the
Meiji Restoration, and free trade in Hong Kong today."
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Today's economies are more accurately titled semi-market economies
since they are influenced by interfering governments and their agencies,
as well as many international organizations. Still, economic tools are
at work and deserve close inspection. Price is one of the most vital
and interesting tools.
Price in a market economy is a question of modern economics. The
buyer's impact on the market is considered demand. The producer ' s
impact is supply. Both supply and demand vary depending on a number of
components. Demand is a function of complements, substitutes, income
levels for normal and inferior goods, transaction costs, elasticity,
tastes 8and preferences, past purchases and expectation of future
prices.
Supply is a function of price pro~ction costs, technology,
transaction costs, and sellers' expectations.
The market manager must
consider these various components before determining prices for products
in given markets.
In a market economy it is likely that consumer preferences for
certain goods will change over time. Suppose consumers demand more of a
given product. Suppliers, however, are not willing to produce more of
the product at the same price. Quantity demanded exceeds quantity
supplied. One of the classical laws of economics states that 11 The price
of a prruJuct wi 11 rise if the demand for the product exceeds its
supply. 11
This is considered upward pressure on price. Over time, a
new demand curve will intersect the existing supply curve at a price
higher than the previous equilibrium price. Because price has increased
so has supplier willingness to produce more. The result is a new point
of equilibrium with a stable quantity demanded and supplied for a
certain price.
Now suppose the producer in a market economy decides to supply more
of a product at each price. The supply curve will shift to the right.
Consumers, responding to a flooded market, will only buy the additional
product if the price decreases. This hypothesis, first advocated by
Jean-Baptiste Say, a nineteenth-century French economist, is not
considered completely acceptable today. George J. Stigler believes
Say's law--supply creates its own demand--is not applicable to modern
market economies. Truly it is more used in non-monetary societies where
income is considered what one produces. Those products are then used to
buy what you need.
Since one's hope of survival is based on income, he will only
produce goods that can be traded. Therefore, increased supply would
suggest increased demand. It is logical that Say would see his world in
this light. But, today's monetary system no longer thinks of the market
as trading eggs for wheat.
Nevertheless, supply-push scenarios are still spoken of. The
demand-pull and supply-push concepts yield the following proposition:
If demand increases, equilibrium price and quantity both rise.
If supply in~ eases, equilibrium quantity rises, but equilibrium
price falls. 1
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p

p

Q

positive demand shift

Q

positive supply shift

In theory, this is how the market should naturally function.
However, the market can be manipulated to some extent. Governments are
generally the actors playing the role of manipulators.
Various
techniques have evolved by which the market is used or altered to insure
equity and political stability. Most unnatural interference affects
price. Price changes then affect demand and supply. The following
techniques are the most widely used.
Sales Taxes. A tax on sales has the effect of shifting the supply
curve to the left--where consumer prices are higher and quantities
supplied are lower. Producers and retailers tend not to absorb the
taxes levied against them, but rather transfer the burden to the
consumers through higher prices. This accounts for an increase in price
and decreases in supply and demand.
Price Ceilings. A price ceiling is often introduced to check an
inflationary market. A price ceiling has the effect of cutting back
production. The products become scarce when the price ceiling is placed
below the equilibrium price. Suppliers are not willing to produce the
amount of product that is demanded for the lower price. Normally,
shortages produce upward pressure on price; however, the pressure cannot
be released because of the interfering ceiling.
Price ceilings were common during World War II. Controlled prices
in Japan partially caused severe food shortages. The city dwellers were
forced to travel into the countryside looking for food. 11 0n one single
day, it was 19torted, over 900,000 persons trekked from Tokyo into the
countryside. 11
Price Floors. A price floor is another form of price interference.
Price floors generally establish a minimum price above the normal
equilibrium value. Suppliers are willing to produce more at the higher
price.
Consumers, however, are not willing to purchase the same
quantities at the higher price level. The result is a product surplus.
Unless the government purchases the surplus, companies will reduce
production to the amount the market will bear.
The United States government, for example, has attempted to support
domestic suppliers of agricultural products since the 1930s. After a
parity price was established between agricultural and non-agricultural
products, any unsold portions of 11 supported 11 crops would be purchased at
90 percent of the parity price by the Commodity Credit Corporation. By
the 1950s, the CCC had enormous amounts of produce in storage. Food
stamps and school lunch programs were started to dispose of the surplus.
Some farmers were even paid not to produce under a system of acreage
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limitations. Whether it is the government or a private organization,
the "buyer of last re1~rt 11 of a product with a price floor must
accumulate an inventory.
Meaningful pri ~ ceilings hold down prices. Meaningful price
floors keep them up. 1 Both price ceilings and unsupported price floors
cause the amount or product exchanged to fall below the normal
equilibrium level. Regulation of price, therefore, whether designed to
benefit the consumer of producer, can stifle a nation's supply system,
cause unemployment, decrease the efficient use of resources and cause
small producers to be pushed out of the market.*
In any case, market distortions are caused by interference.
Unintended and unwanted consequences are often the results when
government intervention seeks to avoid politically adverse situations.*
These are the basic elements of a market economy. The interaction
of these elements makes for an interesting study. Prices in market
economies, for example, are set by considering the price of similar
products already on the market, the elasticity of the product, the
production costs (including labor, materials, technology, and ~~siness
load), shipping costs, sales promotion costs, taxes, and markup.
In a market economy, producers are free to decide their product
prices. Only in the case of government regulations is there an outside
party affecting the price decisions directly. After considering the
company's profit motives, the market and costs, the market manager must
determine the "right" price for the product. Profit motives dictate how
much percentage of straight dollar amount the company must realize in
profits for each unit produced. If the experimental market indicates
that the consumer cost is too high, the wholesalers and retailers are
not willing to cut their profit margins, then the producer must either
cut labor cos ts, decrease the product I s equality, alter the profit
motive, or stop the project until technology or the market changes.
If a firm plans on exporting its product, there are even more
aspects of price to consider. Added to the considerations for domestic
goods are tariffs transport costs, export packaging, insurance costs
and foreign taxes. 16 In addition, the exporting company must understand
the consumer demands of the foreign market. Within what price range
will the product be competitive? What lo/ the overall demand and
competitive situation of the foreign market?
Purely competitive markets would have identical producer prices for
their products.
In reality, however, most markets show imperfect
competition. This allows product prices to vary from city to city,
state to state, country to country. The freedoms offered by a market
economy allow producers to sell above or below the competitors' prices.
Generally, higher prices must be supported by other product features.
For example,
The Singer Company was facing strong price competition in sewing
machines in a Far Eastern market. Singer was able to maintain a
strong market position even though its prices were significantly
higher than prices of the Japanese machines.
The company
emphasized produce quality, liberal credit terms, and sewing
cla~s~s f~ 8 buyers in its successful attempt to maintain market
pos1t1on.
One thing is clear, the price of the produce must be set so as to
maximize return on the export investment. Vern Terpstra gives the
following propositions concerning prices in foreign markets.
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The lower income levels in foreign markets may require the
firm to set a lower price to achieve sales in any volume.
2. Foreign competition may dictate a lower price.
3. The firm realizes that even with a lower f.o.b. plant price,
the product still can be more expensive in the foreign market
because of the transport and tariff costs and other add-ons.
All these add-ons could price the product out of the market if
the f.o.b. plant price were high.
4. The firm may consider that costs of exports are actually less
because research and development, overhea~'9 and some other
costs are already covered by domestic sales.
Whether the market economy is foreign or domestic, general
principles of price, supply and demand apply. Yet, these principles are
not only a pp l i cable to market economies. State economies al so use the
propositions, hypotheses, and theories of price, supply and demand to
structure their production and consumption sectors. State economies,
however, use these pri nci pl es differently than market economies. The
following section points out these differences.
State Economies 20
State economies have four basic tenets: (1) Concentration of power
in the Communist Party representing the working classes, (2) Social
ownership of the means of production, (3) Socially equitable
distribution of national income, and (4) Central economic planning.
Pricing is a feature of each.
It is used to further the Party s
policies, helps determine production goals, plays a role in income
levels, and is a key factor in central economic planning. A brief
introduction is required before we can fully understand why pricing is
an integral part of state economies.
The problem of pricing in a Socialist economy is of a
different order of magnitude from that under capitalism. It is
certainly more complex and controversial. Pricing is not merely
a question of economics but also one of ideology and politics.
Being a value category, price cannot be disassociated from
labour, ideologically the only source of value. And yet if
pricing is to achieve social objectives, prices must deviate
from the amount of labour embodied in particular goods and
services. Pricing is also the most important nerve center on
social grounds. In fact, at one stage in the USSR, economists
were forbidden to discuss the principles of price formation
because, as Molotov warned in 1938, 11 prices concerned politics
not economics. 11
The views widely held in capitalist countries, that
Socialist prices lack rationality and that under central
planning the role of prices is reduced to insignificance, are
grossly misleading.
Although prices do not determine the
a 11 ocati on of resources to the same extent as in a market
economy, in all other respects they play a vital role: they are
actively used as an instrument of economy and s~1ial policies,
and as such they have a rationality of their own.
State economies have been changing their policies concerning price
and market functions for many years. As indicated above, price is a
factor of ideology and politics.
State economies use price to
1.
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manipulate demand. The supply mechanisms are also us~ to control
demand. In market economies the producers are in control.
In most state economies t2~ay, the Law of Value is the underlying
socialist doctrine of prices.
Karl Marx formulated the approach,
which virtually ignores demand as a variable in establishing price.
According to the Marxian formula, value is determined 11 by the amount of
'socially necessary labor' (i.e., efficient labor ijperating under normal
conditions) embodied in the article in question." 2 The formula is:
C

+

V

+ m

c = constant capital (materialized labor)
v = variable capital (wages)
m = surplus value (created by labor alone) 25
It must not be assumed, however, that the Law of Value is accepted
by every socialist planner and economist. Some completely reject the
Law, others accept it totally. One Soviet economist pointed out that
the Law of Value "reflects the most effective ways and means for the
development of Socialists production and the achieveme~of the greatest
poss i b1e effects with the 1owes t poss i b1e out 1ays. 11
However, the
majority of Socialist economists now believe that pricing should be
based not on 'value' but on 'production price,' because only t~~ latter
reflects social cost and is thus more conducive to efficiency."
In truth, neither value nor production costs is the only
consideration. Price setting is a function of many variables all
combined to achieve a variety of objectives. Underlying the new methods
of pricing is still the Law of Value--only today it has been adjusted
and adopted to suit the states' goals.
In the last decade it has become increasingly apparent that not
every socialist economy has the same ends and means. Jozef Wilczynski
has pointed out:
the actual formation and structure of prices in each Socialist
country a re not a product of one comprehensive and consistent
model, but a consequence of historical development and partial
reforms, carried out at different t~§es and influences by ad hoc
social and economic considerations.
One reason for this disparity is that neither Marx nor Stalin left
a complete method for price analysis. Marx also did not exclude any of
the capitalist methods despi;!~ his "violent criticism of the capitalist
market economy" in general.
He did mention, however, 'Y1cJt the end
result of any pricing scheme must show maximum efficiency.
Nicholas
Spulber has said:
The law of value governs prices--the market value constitutes
the point of gravitation of prices--but the price level itself
or price changes automatically provide changes in supply and
demand, provoke reaction, which must be analyzed. Instances of
such an analysis can be found in the works of Marx, and in
particular in the chapter on competition in Vol. III. The
problem of different forms of capitalist monopoly, the changes
in the forms of competition, the diminished role of competition
owing to prices, the reaction of consumers' demand to price
changes or changes in consumers I income--to name only a few of
the problems--not only merit an analysis, but without such an
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analysis it is impossible to understand exactly the mechanism of
contemporary capjfalism, or to build an efficiently functioning
planned economy.
The critical analyses Spulber speaks about are now conducted in
most Socialist countries either directly by a Council of Ministers or
one of its subdivisions. These powers include:
1. Establishing general principles by which to determine prices.
2. Defining the role of different price-setting bo~~es.
3. Fixing the prices of key products and services.
The price-setting hierarchy divides into a State Price Planning
Commission, which receives price proposals from the various ministries.
The ministries base their proposals on the figures given by branch
(economic or industrial) associations and regional price committees.
Despite the fact that price policy is still centrally planned,
price setting functions have been considerably decentralized in the last
wave of economic reforms. Prices for the rnsi~t important raw materials
and consumer goods are still set centrally.
However, a large number
of product prices are negotiated by the market enterprise--so long as
they remain within certain price boundaries the state planners have set.
This freedom is not to be taken as the first step toward eventual
adoption of a market economy. The state will continue to control the
overall market. This way, should the system begin to turn in a
direction adverse to state goals, the freedoms in the marketplace can be
reduced or abolished. The most recent example of this happening is
Czechoslovakia. According to the Czech publication, Zycie gospodarcze,
"The state reduced the range of retail prices which could be determined
freely in the market from 25 percent in 1966 to 13 percent of a34 retail
prices in 1976. Similar controls had to be imposed in 1968. 11
(This
corresponds to the political issues concerning Czechoslovakia at the
same time period.)
The Czech example was one of a step backwards. Most Socialist
countries do not want to make similar mistakes. There exists a general
trend in many state economies to reform the old policies to now
facilitate their industrial growth and export potential. These 11 forward
steps" have not bypassed the critical issue of prices and price setting,
however. Pricing is still used to control the markets.
The two-tiered pricing system is the most widely used. Prices are
paid to the producers by the state. Consumers pay the state for the
products they buy. The whole system is illustrated in more detail on
the following page.
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In principle, this is how prices are set. The main concern is how
the prices are then used to influence supply and demand.
In the first stages of production, industries are given a price
list for raw materials. Each industry is also assigned a quota based on
the previous year's production and any improvements each industry has
made. These quotas are generally not met. Despite government price
incentives to reach the quotas, many pl ant managers purposely fail to
match actual production levels with the state-imposed goals.
The
reasons behind this are based purely on logic. The managers know that
if they reach their quotas, then the p1anners wi 11 assume that the
industry is healthy and should stretch even more next year. To keep
quotas from skyrocketing managers purposely fall short each year.
The state is not powerless, of course, when it wants to increase
production.
If it wants to encourage consumption of a particular
product, it will simply raise the enterprise cost. The extra funds
allow industrial managers to expand their operations. The fact that
enterprise costs rise does not mean that consumer prices will also
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increase. This would defeat the state's purpose of expanding demand
since higher price means lower consumption. To solve the problem, the
state simply receives less profit from the fluctuating turnover tax. If
the state wants to decrease or increase demand, it raises or lowers the
tax yield.
This is one of the key tools the state economies use to control the
amount and nature of products passing through the market. A greater tax
yield (an increase in the turnover tax) will increase the retail cost.
According to the theory of demand, rising unit price will decrease
product consumption. As one can readily see, the market is assumed to
behave as it would in any economy. The difference is that in market
economies consumer tastes and preferences affect supply and demand. In
the state economy, the price is used to manipulate demand and alter the
consumers' tastes and preferences.
Prices are also manipulated to control income levels and private
savings. State economies thrive on the constant exchange of money.
Idle money does not help the system. If too much money is suspected of
being saved at home, then the planning committees will simply raise the
prices of the basic consumer goods. Si nee the e 1asti city curve for
these goods is fairly verticle, consumers will be forced to pay the
higher prices. The end effect is to bring the excess capital from out
of the closets and put it into the system.
However, there is ample evidence that neither the groducers nor the
consumers appreciate or want changes in retail prices. 3 Instead, it is
suggested that nominal wages be regulated in order to control the
distribution or accumulation of personal income. 37
One area, in respect to income control, has been difficult for
state economies to handl e--the b1ack market. Mani es exchanged through
the black market are virtually impossible to tax, let alone estimate.
The black market also affects supply and demand. Ota Sik has summed it
up this way:
Since producers are, to a considerable degree, given incentives
to engage in productive activities that run counter to demand,
perpetual shortages and an attendant parallel (or second)
economy operating through ~eack markets have become hallmarks of
the Soviet-type economies.
When there is a scarcity of goods, there is upward pressure on
price. The private se 11 ers can charge more for the commodity in the
open markets without the fear of too much pressure from the state.
Depending on the products, some black marketers wait to se 39 until the
state system fa i 1s to meet the 1eve 1 of consumer demands.
Entering
the market at this time they can charge more for their goods and drain
the c~pit~
out of the consumers that the state would prefer
capturing.
Another basic market function employed by Socialist countries is
price freezing. The purpose and technique is the same as in market
economies.
Czechoslovakia used this tool to fight uncontrolled
inflation in 1970. The freeze was only temporary since in the long run
11
th is measure was bound to have an adverse effect on the resp4rs i veness
of production enterprises and trade organization to demand. 11
In the
short run it did stabilize demand and stopped the unnatural flov,1 of
capital out of the investment sector.
Some Socialist countries, like Yugoslavia, have released price
controls and fixed target prices to restrict domestic demand instead.
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The Yugoslavian Economic 4~esolution of 1982 sets target prices 15
percent higher than 1981.
The goal is to decrease demand for a 11
goods except those of basic necessity. This appears to be a move toward
freeing resources for export production instead of domestic consumption.
Direct government subsidies to industry is another means used by
which to control the ends. In the case of Soviet agricultural products,
the desired ends were low, stable prices for food. This was a difficult
goal. From 1970-78 average wages in state agriculture rose by more than
40 percent. Over the same period of time, pay per day on the collective
farms rose 34 percent. These two factors, added with increasing
expenditurij~ on machinery, fuel, and fertilizer, resulted in immense
subsidies.
Garbuzov, the Finance Minister, has stated that subsidies
paid to state and c~ lective farms will reach 100 billion rubles for the
five years 1976-80.
Most state economies subsidize a number of industries beside
agriculture. Bread producers are given large subsidies to keep the
price of bread artificially low. Energy producers receive large amounts
of subsidy aid. Rent is also subsidized by the government. Depending
on occupation, family size and location, a Soviet worker can have all or
most rent paid by the government.
Demand is also manipulated by forcing thousands of shoppers to
stand hours in line for the most basic necessities. This queuing can be
for meat, butter, toilet paper, or clothes. If one considers standing
in line for hours, he might decide to change his tastes instead. There
is invariably enough product available for goods the government wishes
to dispose of that queuing is unnecessary. Yet, when a product is
scarce or subject to tight government control, it may be allocated bit
by bit through the art of 11 line-making. 11
When one really analyzes why the state economies are so controlled
and watched, they discover the explanation lies in the desire for
political stability.
This is a paramount concern of all state
governments, and prices are involved here too.
When prices are stable, the political situation is stable. To ease
mounting political pressures, the Polish government continually promised
not to raise prices from 1971-75. There had been a year of severe
worker's revolts in 1970. The government's "price pegging" brought a
shaky but important peace. Over the years, however, financial pressures
grew too severe. Back-to-back price increases for dairy and meat
products were initiat~ in 1978. Riots and general unrest spread
throughout the country.
Political stability is truly the final goal of Socialist countries.
If the consumers are allowed all of the freedoms given in market
economies, their tastes and preferences wi 11 drastically affect the
production mechanism. For this reason, price is used to manipulate
demand. And yet, the people must be given some incentives to continue
with the state plans. For this reason, there are subsidies, wage
incentives, medical benefits, secured employment and income, death
benefits, and free education opportunities.
There are definite advantages to both state and market systems. On
the other hand, there are al so some di sti net disadvantages. Some of
these will be highlighted in the critical analysis.
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Critical Analysis
With the exception of Josef Willzynski and Constantin Krylov, the
other writers about price and Socialist economies I studied condemned
the systems. Writers such as Marie Lavigne and Paul Gregory criticized
the Socialist economies for being arbitrary, inefficient in their use of
natural resources, exploitive of the people and ignorant of the
consumers real needs. The criticisms can be recognized as genuine when
one analyzes the various economies. However, there is something to be
learned from the Socialist system that could be of value to the
countries using the market system. I am not advocating total adoption
of the state economy. I do see some of its merits, however.
First of all, I agree with Jozef Willzynski in stating that ag
article 1 s value for society should not be based on the amount used.
Just because every household has a dishwasher or television should not
mean tha it is of greater value than old books about Japanese
culture.
I take it another step further--the Socialist system is not
over burdened by radical changes in consumer demand simply because of
fads. Too often in market economies value is determined not only by the
amount of a product in use but by how 11 cool 11 or 11 hip 11 it is to own.*
There is little fundamental practicality in a sheer top worn by girls
that serve the purpose of getting them noticed or showing off what they
in actuality lack. Why have the biggest set of tires on your jeep or
raciest pinstriping on your vet? In a Socialist economy the potential
of the production system is not wasted on frivolity or fads.
On the other hand, those criticizing the Socialist system can use
this point of controlled or directed demand to defend the market
economy. Freedom of choice or consumer sovereignty is protected in the
market system. This is the basis of free enterprise. What would happen
to the system if companies were prevented from developing new products
or services that may be considered consumer fads or frills? Some
products cannot be produced because of their potential danger to the
consumer. For the most part, however, the rule of production is 11 if the
consumer demands it, someone will produce it! 11 This may be the reason
why market economies consistently supply the world with the newest
technologies and most innovative products.
There is a definite paradox involved here. Perhaps the advocates
of the 11 convergence theory 11 are right? Will the market systems and
state systems become increasingly similar? Will both systems surrender
a little individuality and evolve into each other? In time, this might
be the outcome. But, for the present, it is best to respect each system
and work around the differences.
1
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THE WEST GERMAN EXAMPLE OF VOTER TURNOUT
by Roger White
I.

Introduction

During a recent midterm congressional election I was reminded of
the process that the average American citizen must go through to vote.
This process began, in my case, several weeks in advance of the actual
vote. First, I had to make a number of phone ca 11 s to determine where
to register. Then, I was forced to take time out of my daily schedule
to go down and register during their office hours. Registration was
only the beginning, however, as I spent the next few weeks trying to
sort through the multitude of information about the election in order to
make the best choices. Finally, the day to cast my ballot arrived, but
I found that voting was not much easier than the rest of the process.
For one thing, it took a fair amount of effort just to find someone who
could direct me to the voting place, and for another, I had to stand in
line for about 20 minutes. As I left the voting booth, wondering how
much difference my one vote could make anyway, I had a better
understanding of why only about half the eligible citizens vote in the
United States.
This voting experience led me to wonder why democratic countries
like West Germany have such a high voter turnout as compared to the
United States. Most reports agree that the German Federal Republic has
averaged about 87 percent voter turnout s i nee its establishment after
~lorld Wa 2 II.
In recent elections, turnout has risen to over 90
percent.
During this same time period thJ United States has averaged
less than 60 percent in national elections.
After doing some reading on this subject, I came to the conclusion
that there are quite a few variables that might affect voter turnout.
Some of these variables include registration laws, electoral systems,
socioeconomic status, and cultural influences. The question is which of
these variables has enough impact on voter turnout to cause the
significant differences between turnout in the United States and West
Germany? There does not appear to be a consensus as to the answer to
this question. In fact, this question has been a source of debate among
many experts.
The hypothesis that I am most comfortable with is that voting in a
democratic country is somewhat like the interaction that occurs in the
marketplace of a free enterprise economy. In the marketplace, the price
a person is willing to pay for an item depends on the item's importance
to that individual. If the price is too high, the individual won't buy
it. Likewise, if the item is not important to the individual, he will
not buy it. So, the two essential considerations in making a market
decision are price and importance of the item to the individual.
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Like this market concept, voting is also a decision that must
involve a consideration of price and importance. The price of voting is
the investment one must give in time and effort to register and then
vote. The price an individual will pay to vote depends on how important
voting is to him. If a society wants to raise voter turnout using this
theory, then they must either lower the price of voting or raise the
importance of voting among the members of that society. From my study,
it appears that West Germany has a higher voter turnout than the Uni t ed
States because of a combination of price and importance. Accordingly,
the thesis that will guide this appear is that voter turnout in the
German Federal Republic is higher than the United States because voting
is easier in West Germany and because Germans value voting more than
Americans.
I have limited this study to the post-World War II time period
(1949 to the present) and only to national elections, rather than state,
local, or primary elections. This study is also limited to sources in
the English language.
This is a qualitative, comparative study and will proceed by giving
some background to the problem and then analyzing the two variables of
price and importance of voting.
II.

Setting the Stage

The purpose of this section is to establish a foundation for the
analysis that will follow. Background information and definitions will
be established to clarify the problem.
Political Participation
Political participation is the general concept of which voting is a
part.
Numerous
activities
could
be classified
as
political
participation. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie define participation as
any activity 11 aimed at influencing t~e selection of governmental
personnel and/or the actions they take. 11
Participation might include
making a political contribution, attending political meetings, writing
to a public official, working on a campaign, or visiting a government
office. Some even go so far as to say that putting a political bumper
sticker on a car or talking about politics with a friend is political
participation. Of all these activities, however, voting is acknowledged
as the form of participation that involves the most people. In fact,
one author explains that 11 for a large number of 5itizens voting was the
only form of political participation 11 engaged in.
In the United States, general political participation has
traditionally been high. In Almond and Verba's famous 1963 study of
five Western democracies, we find 51 percent of American respondents
feeling that the ordinary citizen should take an active role in his
com~unity, while only 22 percent of West Germans felt this should be
so.
An interesting phenomenon, however, is the fact that voter turnout
in the United States is one of the lowest of all democratic countries.
~lest Germany, on the other hand, has not been high in most areas of
political participation since World War II, but has been extremely high
in voter turnout. The Almond and Verba study points out the fact that
participation in general among Germans has not been extensive. One
example of low participation, historically, is that West Germans seldom
discuss politics informally.
As was mentioned earlier, though, voting
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has been one aspect of political activity that Germans have consistently
been involved in.
Recent literature on West Germany, however, indicates that forms of
political participation other than voting are on the increase. As
Table 2.1 illustrates, political discussion among West Germans has
increased dramatically over the past 20 years.
This may be an
indication that Almond and Verba's concerns of 1963 are changing for the
better, since higher rates of political involvement are usually
considered to create a more stable democratic system. Another source
indicates that Germans are now participating more in other activities
such as 811 campa i gn acti vi ty--showi ng party support and attending
meetings."
Table 2.1
FREQUENCY OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION IN WEST GERMANY 9
Fre9uenc1

July
1953

June
1959

July
1961

Oct.
1965

Sept.
1969

Dec.
1972

Daily

8.60%

10. 70%

10. 30%

9.80%

37 .10%

50.20%

Occasionally

28.50

49.80

50.70

65.70

39.50

34.30

Never

62.90

39.40

38.90

24.50

23.40

15.50

Sample Mean

1.47

1. 71

1. 70

1.85

2 .10

2.34

N

3236

941

1278

1141

1190

1362

49

Figure 2.1
PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS, 1972lO
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We can see from Figure 2.1 that West Germans are participating in
politics in a number of ways. As other forms of political participation
increase in West Germany, voter turnout continues to be high. This
paper will focus on the reasons for this high turnout in sections that
follow.
Institutional Differences
One of the problems with a study such as this one is that the
political institutions of the countries under study are different in
many ways, and therefore strict comparisons are difficult.
The
differences that affect this study are in the legislatures and the
electoral system.
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It was stated earlier that this paper would focus only on national
elections. This definition causes problems because national elections
are different in the United States than they are in West Germany. We
have national elections in the United States for the Presidency, for the
House of Representatives, and for the Senate. In West Germany, the only
real national elections are the elections of members to the lower house
of the legislature, called the Bundestag. Bundestag elections take
place every four years, barring a vote of no-confidence. This means
national elections in West Germany are less frequent than in the United
States. This fact may have some effect on voter turnout which will be
discussed later. The President and the upper house, or Bundesrat, are
not included in the national elections because the President is elected
indirectly, and Bundesrat members are representatives of the lander
(local) governments.
The second difference in the two governments that has an impact on
this study is the difference in electoral systems. Senators and
Representatives in the United States are popularly elected, while the
President is elected by means of the electoral college. In the Federal
Republic of Germany, national elections are a little more complicated.
David Conradt writes that "the question of how West Germans are to elect
their
representatives
remains
one of i~e few controversial
constitutional issues in German politics."
As was mentioned,
elections for the Bundestag are the only true national elections and
therefore the only elections considered here. Some have called the
system for electing Bundestag members a "personalize PR" system because
it 11 combi nes e 1ements from its two predecessors: both s i ngl e-memb 12
constituencies and proportional representation with party lists."
This system allows each person to vote twice--once for an individual
candidate and once for a party. These differences all show that the act
of voting is different in West Germany than it is in the United States
and therefore make some comparisons difficult.
Although voter registration will be dealt with in the following
section, it must be briefly mentioned here for the purpose of defining
voter turnout. Germany is different than the United States in that they
take the initiative in registering all eligible citizens themselves.
Since a large majority of all eligible voters are automatically
registered, voting statistics in West Germany are given according to the
percentage of registered voters who vote. Since not all eligible
Americans are registered, statistics are usually given as the percentage
of eligible citizens who vote. It would be best if we could compare
eligible citizens of both countries, but it does not make too much
difference, since nearly all eligible citizens are also registered
voters in Germany.
III.

The

11

Price 11 of Voting

The objective of this section is to give support to the argument
that voter turnout increases when the voting process is made more
convenient.

51

Registration
Voter registration in West Germany is not a difficult process. The
fact that eligible citizens are automatically registered by the
government has a 1 ready been mentioned. Perhaps a few more deta i 1s on
how this is done would be helpful. Richard Carlson of the National
Municipal League explains that each municipality in the Federal Republic
of Germany has "three offices whose activities lfontribute to the
creation and maintenance of the electoral rolls. 11
He continues by
explaining that the municipal registrar's office collects records on
births, deaths and marriages, and the registration office records all
arrivals and departures, such as people moving.
Then the election
office uses the data gathered by the other two offices to compile lists
of eligible voters. All this is done automatically by the election
office, and since the entire population is required by law to register
as citizenf 4 they are also registered as voters whether they desire to
be or not.
The American voter, on the other hand, must initiate the
registration process himself.
Since the United States allows each
individual state to set its own registration requirements, it will be
impossible to examine each of them. It is obvious, however, that it is
much more difficult for the citizen to be responsible for his own
registration than for the government to do it for him. In the American
system a citizen is forced to locate the place of registration, perhaps
to take time out of important responsibilities, and then to go register.
Many argue that the 1ittle inconveniences of registration in the
United States combine to the degree many citizens just don't bother to
register and hence, don't vote either. Steven Rosen stone and Raymond
Wolfinger, two scholars on voting behavior, concluded that "registration
laws have a substantia\1ffect on the number of people who go to the
polls on election day. 11
The findings of their research suggest that
if all states adopted liberal voter registration laws, as some states
a 1ready :hf ve, "turnout would increase by approximately 9 .1 percentage
points."
Taking these findings even closer to the purpose of this
paper, Wolfinger and Rosenstone said, 11 we are confident that
establishing a European-type registration sy~t;em would increase voter
turnout by substantially more than 9 percent. 11
A few examples might add strength to Rosenstone and Wolfinger's
position. First, we could use the example of President Carter's recent
attempt to change registration laws so that citizens could register on
voting day. Although Carter expressed the desire to help the people by
making voting easier, many felt that his ulterior motive was to help the
Democratic party. They argued that a majority of those who do not vote
are Democrats, and so by making registration easier, Carter would have
increased voter turnout, which would have helped the Democratic
candidates. The implicit assumption behind this whole situati@n is that
making registration laws lighter will increase voter turnout.
Two other examples involve younger voters. Research has indicated
that younger voters do not vote as much as middle-aged voters. Some
have argued that the reason for this is that the young move more often,
and that when you are fairly new in a location, voter registration is
more difficult.
This difficulty keeps the new residents from
registering and, therefore, from voting. One exception to this voting
pattern among younger voters, however, is the college campus vote.
Turnout has been high among college students, and the same registration
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argument could apply here. It is argued that colleges usually have
registration tables on campus, which makes registering convenieri"lg for
students. Once they are registered, they are more likely to vote.
These arguments seem logical, and they do give us reason to believe
that voter registration affects voter turnout. There are those who
disagree with this position, however. Kevin Phillips and Paul Blackman
have written an entire book on the subject, entitled Electoral Reform
and Voter Participation, Federal Registration: A False Remedy for Voter
Apathy. In this book the authors contend that registration aws do not
significantly change voter turnout and that we need to look to
socioeco2Bmic, political, and cultural factors to explain voter
turnout.
One other argument against the effect of registration laws on voter
turnout is given by Robert S. Erikson of the University of Houston. He
argues that states with few registration requirements do not show a
higher turnout of voters than states which have strict registration
requirements. His explanation for this is that those who have made a
sacrifice to regi ste;r1 for the vote will not 1et their sacrifice go to
waste by not voting.
The Act of Voting
Voting itself is somewhat different in West Germany than it is in
the United States. Rather than voting on a Tuesday in November as we do
in the United States, West Germans vote on a 11 Sunday or a pub 1i c
ho 1i day. 11
The month of the vote is not set.
With a vote of
no-confidence, of course, elections would be held at that time.
Normally, though, elections to the Bundestag are held every four years,
sometime 11 during the last three months of the legislative term. 11 The
chancellor has the responsibility of deciding the date of the election.
Polls are usually set up in railway depots or hospitals, and if you are
away f2;?m home you can still cast your ballot through the 11 postal
vote. 11
As with voter registration, there are also many who argue that West
German voting itself is easier than in the United States and that this
convenience causes higher voter turnout. The main reason people take
this stand is the fact that Germans vote on a Sunday or holiday.
Lewis J. Edinger explains that because 11 elections always come on ~~ndays
a voter can spare the time and will not suffer a loss of income. 11
An example might aid in substantiating this position. Gunter Golde
of the University of California at Berkeley did some research on
Southwest Germany.
He explains that this region is mostly rural
farmland. Controlling for the religion variable, Golde studied voting
patterns.
In his research he found that Catholics vote more than
Protestants from this region. His conclusion was that Catholics have a
higher voter turnout because the act of voting is more convenient for
them. The reason voting is more convenient for the Catholic population
of this area is that they attend church more than Protestants; and since
German election~ 4are on Sunday, Catholics are already 11 present at the
polling place. 11
Thus, according to Golde, ease or convenience of
voting does have an impact on voter turnout.
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IV.

The

11

Value 11 Placed on Voting

This section's purpose is to show that the value an individual or
society attaches to voting will affect voter turnout.
Culture
One of the factors that seems to influence the value an individual
places on voting is culture. Political culture is usually defined as a
set of norms that help the individual citizen understand how he should
act in a democracy. Obviously, if the political culture is strongly
oriented toward participation, then the individual citizen will place a
greater value on participation and be more likely to participate. The
increase in voter turnout in a participant-oriented political culture
should be apparent.
Almond and Verba take the idea of political culture a step further
in their research on civic culture. They define civic culture as a
11
participant political culture in which the political culture and
political structure are congruent. 11 25 The achievement of this kind of
civic culture would be the ideal of any democracy since the citizens
would participate to a large extent and would have confidence in the
structure within which they were participating.
Many have argued that West Germany has not yet established this
civic culture. One author in 1973 said 11 that a democratic pol itic~ 6
culture simply does not exist in West Germany at the present time. 11
The reason many have held to this position is that the only form of
participation West Germans have become involved in was voting. Edinger
explains the German's tradition~)ly high voter turnout as a sense of
11
civic duty to go to the polls. 11
This has been a common feeling among
scholars before the 1970s; but, as was pointed out earlier, West Germans
are beginning to participate in numerous ways; and it may well be that
they are now developing their civic culture.
Civic culture exerts a social pressure on citizens to participate
and obviously cannot be overlooked as a factor in voter turnout. An
individual gains these cultural values through the continual process of
socialization. If our families, friends, and other members of society
impart to us a value for voting through the socialization process, then
we will be more likely to vote.
Relative Importance
Often, the value we hold for voting depends on our personal
position. The importance of voting is relative to the individual 1 s
needs. One example of this is the 11 farm vote. 11 Farmers have typically
had a higher voter turnout than other o~pations. This is true in
Germany as well as in the United States.
l✓ olfinger and Rosenstone
give us an explanation of this phenomenon in their book, Who Votes?
They say the answer lies in two areas. First, government 11 programs give
and loan money, limit production, buy crops, guarantee prices, regula~§
farm labor, give advice, improve land, provide water and so on. 11
Second, farmers have 11 wide fluctuations in their ~nomic fortunes,
often because of real or imagined government actions. 11
If Wolfinger 1 s
and Rosenstone s hypothesis is correct, then we must conclude that voter
turnout is affected by personal, relative importance.
Certain
government employees also fall into this category with farmers, since
they are often voting to keep their jobs.
1
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Wolfinger gives us another illustration of the effect of relative
value on voter turnout. He says that Americans probably valu~flections
less than Europeans because we have so many elections here.
In the
case of a West German, he may only have one national election in four
years, so that one election has more value to him than a national
election to an American who votes every other year or more.
V. Conclusion
This paper began by relating the concept of a free market to the
voting decision. The thesis we began with was that two factors-- 11 price 11
and 11 value 11 --are important to voting, as well as market decisions.
After giving some background information and definitions, we proceeded
to examine the price of voting, which is the effort one spends to
register and then to vote. Following this, we analyzed the value of
voting, which takes into consideration the reasons for one society
placing a greater importance on voting than another society. From the
evidence presented in this paper, it appears that the hypothesis is
fairly workable. The hypothesis itself is somewhat general, however,
and further research might be helpful if it narrowed in on certain
aspects of this study and obtained more quantitative data which could be
more easily compared.
In the voter turnout comparison between West Germany and the United
States, West Germany clearly has an advantage (see Figure 5.1).
Although the evidence is not conclusive, it appears that the difference
may be due to the fact that the Germans value voting more and can vote
at a lower price.
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Figure 5.1
VOTER TURNOUT IN THE UNITED STATES AND WEST GERMANY
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